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Abstract
It has often been said that the Zhuangzi莊子 advocates political abstention, and that its
putative skepticism prevents it from contributing in any meaningful way to political
thinking: at best the Zhuangzi espouses a sort of anarchism, at worst it is “the night in
which all cows are black,” a stance that one scholar has charged is ultimately immoral.
This article tracks possible political allusions within the text, and, by reading these
against details of social, political, and historical context, sheds light on another strand of
the Zhuangzi—one that questions prevailing normative values because it is fiercely
critical of scholarly complicity with violent imperial territorial consolidation.
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1 Introduction
Listed in the Han Shu漢書, a catalogue of the Han 漢 Imperial library, and canonized in
the Tang唐 dynasty as one of the four Daoist classics (Sizi Zhenjing四子真經) by emperor
Xuanzhong 玄宗, who also conferred upon it the title of True Scripture of the Southern
Efflorescence (Nanhua Zhenjing 南華真經) (742 C.E.) (Boltz 2001, Zhang 2015), the
Zhuangzi’s 莊子 historical orbit through ancient halls of power has nonetheless not
prevented its perceived political irrelevance today (Van Norden 2015).1 Amidst the
North Atlantic academy’s growing interest in non-North Atlantic texts,2 the attention paid
to the political implications of Daoist sources tends to alight on the Daodejing 道德經,
rather than the Zhuangzi (Crane 2013, Puett 2001).
Dao (2019) 18:411–433
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1 Certainly, unlike Confucianism, it has not returned to the expedient embrace of China’s ruling elite (Billioud
and Thoraval 2015, Israel 2016). See report by Chris Buckley (Buckley 2014).
2 In the discipline of philosophy see Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, and Larson 1988; in political theory, Jenco
2017, Dallmayr 1997, Euben 2006, and Williams and Warren 2014.
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The Zhuangzi is often seen as actively advocating political apathy, as critical of
political involvement tout court. The Zhuangzi’s skepticism, it is argued, renders it
unable (or unwilling) to provide a moral compass to anchor political judgment and
guide political action; at best the Zhuangzi espouses a sort of anarchism
(Hansen 2003, Coutinho 2013), at worst it is “the night in which all cows
are black,” a stance that one scholar has charged is ultimately immoral (Van
Norden 2016).3 Instead of addressing the Zhuangzi’s putative skepticism, which
has been abundantly analyzed by scholars,4 this article adopts another approach
to exploring the political implications of the text.
This article makes a modest interpretive proposal. It shows how the political
concerns within certain strands of the Zhuangzi may be illuminated by reading the text
against the historical and political conditions of its composition. The article identifies
textual allusions to political problems and actions, which are then juxtaposed
against illustrative material details of the sociopolitical context derived from
historiographical accounts. This tacking back and forth between text and his-
torical context illuminates another interpretative possibility for reading the
Zhuangzi, namely, that instead of political apathy or antipathy, at least some
of its passages provide a critical commentary on “imperial virtues,” that is,
“virtues” that the text identifies with the organization and consolidation of an imperial
politics. In doing so, the text itself may be seen as a performative attempt to short-circuit
a centralizing, nascent imperial discourse.
The article is organized in the following way. After a discussion and justification of
interpretive methods (“Methodology”), I address passages that appear to advocate
political apathy, and show that taking the Zhuangzi’s intended (historical) audience of
cultural and political elites into account reveals another interpretation (in
“Disengagement from Worldly Affairs [Ren Jian Shi 人間世]”). I trace the political
allusions in the Zhuangzi’s criticisms of sages and sagely wisdom, and in doing so,
show how passages that otherwise appear skeptical or simply puzzling in fact are
allusions to imperial consolidation, and criticisms of sagely and scholarly complicity in
imperial oppressions (in “The Complicity of Sages and Their Ideals”). The
sections that follow explore how the Zhuangzi’s mockery of the sage emperors,
who were credited with the foundation of (Chinese) civilization, may be read as
a performative undermining of legitimizing discourses of sovereignty and em-
pire (in “Cosmos-politics” and “Against Exemplary Sage-Emperors”). The final
section illustrates the interpretive possibilities opened up by an attentiveness to
the political dimensions of the text. By reading oblique political elements in the
Cook Ding (Pao Ding 庖丁) narrative in relation to historical ritual and political
practice, the section offers an admittedly speculative interpretation of the Cook’s
teaching, an alternative to its frequent rendering as an exegesis of “skillful spontaneity”
(“Playful Speculations on Cook Ding”).
3 The latter criticism is Mengzi’s (Van Norden 2016: 14). For a contrary view see Nelson 2008. It is not
entirely clear if the Zhuangzi’s political apathy or antipathy is an effect or cause of the text’s putative
skepticism and/or relativism. Some scholars have seen in the Zhuangzi a value pluralism that is the hallmark
of political liberalism (Fraser 2009, 2015; Sturgeon 2015; but see Perkins 2014).
4 Issues of skepticism and relativism are addressed amply in the literature, for example, Kjellberg and Ivanhoe
1996, Fraser 2009, Raphals 1994a, Ziporyn 2003, Chinn 1997, Allinson 2015, and Soles and Soles 1998.
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2 Methodology
There are a number of indications that political concerns are not altogether precluded
from the Zhuangzi. Earlier interpreters certainly saw a political relevance in the text. LIU
An 劉安, imperial kinsman and king of Huainan 淮南, borrowed extensively from the
Zhuangzi to compose his treatise on government, Huainanzi 淮南子 (Master of
Huainan), which he presented to the Han emperor in 139 B.C.E. (cf. Major, Queen,
Meyer, and Roth 2010: 238).5 Allusions to the Zhuangzi are also found in the Lüshi
Chunqiu呂氏春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Lü), “a legalistic compendium
from the third century B.C.E.” (Mair 2001: 10). Closer to our time, Joseph Needham
argues that the Zhuangzi (like other proto-Daoist texts) was critical of the form of
feudalism that existed in China at the time (Needham 1956). Finally, the text of the
Zhuangzi itself is full of political figures, mythical or otherwise, such as emperors,
dukes, kings, and their advisors, and the last of the Inner Chapters, “For Emperors and
Kings (Ying Di Wang 應帝王),” consists of a series of questions on how to govern.
It may be that it is difficult to pin any kind of politics on the Zhuangzi because of the
nature of the text. Its mythical creatures, comical old men, talking trees, foolish
philosophers, ex-cons, and other figures fleetingly appear to tell a joke or a tall tale,
pose a logic puzzle, or impart difficult-to-decipher advice, in lyrical prose. This
polyvocal and open form evades interpretive closure (Gentz and Meyer 2015, Tan
2016), and makes it difficult to ascribe to the text any specific or explicitly political
position. Its uncertain provenance and complex history of transmission makes it
difficult to assign authorial intent and to align the text with the known political views
of any historical figure (Chan 2002, Graham 2003, Lin 2003, Liu 1994, Fraser 1997,
Jiang 2016, Klein 2011).
The lack of consensus over periodization, however, need not prevent references to
the historical conditions of textual composition and transmission, since the material
events of imperial formation and consolidation (with which the Zhuangzi engages) are
of longue durée. During the Warring States or Zhan Guo 戰國, to which the earliest
strata of the Zhuangzi have been assigned, seven kingdoms vied for hegemony. Rulers
sought to centralize power as they dissolved noble lineages, and conscripted com-
moners and refugees for infrastructural projects and increasingly long wars, laying the
foundations for the imperial states that followed. Empire was not erected all at once;
instead, mechanisms for securing territory, for absorbing and integrating peasant
populations through taxation, conscription, and labor, and for channeling scholars
and newly dispossessed nobles into administrative service were adopted in piecemeal
fashion, evolving in response to internal intrigue and external threats.
The textual interpretation in this article traces allusions to the emergence and consol-
idation of imperial politics in different parts of the Zhuangzi, including what are known as
the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters of the GUO Xiang 郭象 recension. Though many
scholars hold that the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters are later additions to the corpus,
the decision in this article to deal with the entirety of the Zhuangzi is based on the
5 Especially in this chapter “Quintessential Spirit (Jing Shen精神)” in the Huainanzi: “Specific turns of phrase,
technical terminology, and critiques of practitioners of daoyin [導引] (Grandfather Peng’s [彭] Ripe Old Agers)
and of embittered self-promoting moralists (Confucians) are so close that one could make a fair case for
common authorship” (Major et al. 2010: 238). Cf. Roth 2015.
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specificities of classical Chinese manuscript culture, in which composite works relied on
editors and compilers and were meant to be read alongside a cumulative tradition of
textual commentary (Nylan 2016).6 A further cautionary note is the need to find some
form of consistency that does not derive from the norms of coherence based on a North
Atlantic model of authorship predicated on a single authorial voice. This article does not
claim that the Zhuangzi, in its entirety, is anti-imperialistic, or that a critique of imperialism
constitutes the primary political message of the text. Rather its more modest claim is that
we may discern passages and sentiments critical of imperialistic methods in the Zhuangzi.
Though these may not necessarily be consistent with other extant passages on the arts of
governing, the anti-imperial material is significant enough to warrant analysis. This is
especially so since it has thus far been overlooked. This study therefore provides an initial
exploration of the politics of the Zhuangzi, and lays the groundwork for future analyses of
possible contrary and/or complimentary textual positions.
The article’s interdisciplinary reading of the Zhuangzi fuses methods from literary
interpretation, historical interpretation, and North Atlantic philosophical practice in
order to pay heed to the historical and discursive specificities of the Zhuangzi (Nylan
2016, Defoort 2001, Raphals 1994b). It is rooted in studies of the rhetorical, literary,
and imaginary aspects of the Zhuangzi, which are inseparable from its philosophical
questions. It is also distantly informed by Quentin Skinner and the “Cambridge
School,” which stresses historical context in textual interpretation. However, the
interpretive work here always begins with a close reading of specific sections of text,
and the tracing of political allusions therein.
3 Disengagement from Worldly Affairs?
The Zhuangzi contains many passages that appear at first glance to demonstrate a
world-weariness that advises disengagement with worldly affairs, or what is labeled
today as “politics,” and none more apparently than the passages of the Inner Chapter,
“Worldly Affairs (Ren Jian Shi 人間世).”
The chapter opens with Confucius dissuading his disciple, YAN Hui 顏回, from
offering unsolicited advice to the autocrat of Wei衛: if YAN Hui criticized the autocrat,
he would be executed; but if he went with the flow of courtly politics, he would end up
conforming to the standards he had sought to change; finally, if the ruler were of a mind
to heed YAN Hui’s advice, then he would have had no need of such advice in the first
place.7 Another anecdote recounts Zigao 子高 lamenting his appointment as an envoy
tasked with difficult negotiations. Confucius tells him: since both fate and duty are
inescapable, “Absorb yourself in the realities of the task at hand to the point of
forgetting your own existence. Then you will have no leisure to delight in life or abhor
death” (Zhuangzi 12/10/18–22; Ziporyn 2009: 100).8 There are other similar passages
6 On another approach to the coherence of the Zhuangzi as a whole, see De Reu 2015. On the challenges
specific to interpreting classical Chinese, see Yu, Bol, Owen, and Peterson 2000.
7 Confucius’ final counsel is gnomic.
8 This is the Ziporyn translation. For greater consistency I refer to the Watson translation, which includes all of
the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters, but modify or substitute these at times. Textual references to the
Zhuangzi follows the numbering system used in Zhuangzi Yinde 莊子引得 (A Concordance to Chuang Tzu)
(Hung 1956).
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in the chapter. We may simply note that in the penultimate section, a madman sings a
song, in Confucius’ hearing, about the sage or sheng ren聖人. Given the circumstances
of the age, the madman sings, the sage’s best hope is to avoid execution; the sage
should stop confronting the world with his virtuosity (respectively, Zhuangzi 12/4/86–
89, 90–91). Thus, at first sight, the chapter appears to suggest a stance favoring political
nonengagement.
However, aside from these explicit exhortations, there is an added layer of signif-
icance in the sociopolitical status of its characters. Aside from Confucius and YAN Hui,
there is Zigao子高, who was a minister of the Chu楚 kingdom; others include QU Boyu
蘧伯玉, a minister, and YAN He 顏闔, a scholar (Zhuangzi 10/4/53–64). The advice of
nonengagement is thus dispensed to a specific social strata, one composed of scholars,
ministers, and (potential) administrators. Additionally, the audience or readers of the
text would have been, as Michael Nylan notes, “members of the governing elite”
(Nylan 2016: 98), especially since “only an estimated ten percent of the entire
population commanded basic literacy and numeracy, and no more than a fraction of
the literate enjoyed the sort of ‘high cultural literacy’ that reading the Zhuangzi
requires” (Nylan 2016: 101).
The elite status of the characters, as well as that of the presumed audience of the text,
takes on special significance when seen in the context of the extraordinary geopolitical
changes wrought in the lifetimes of Confucius, Zigao, YAN He, and QU Boyu. The
addressees of the chapter are shi 士 and men of similar status, “common gentlemen in
the Zhou [周] aristocracy” trained in military and civil capacities including “ritual,
music, archery, charioteering, writing, and mathematics” (Hsu 1999: 583). Over the
course of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the concentration of
power in the hands of the monarch and the decline of hereditary noble houses meant
waning fortunes for the shi, who became a “new category of administrative staff” (Hsu
1999: 583), appointed as “an extension of royal power” (Lewis 1999b: 604). Shi status
came to signify cultural excellence instead, and this “new ideal type” (Lewis 1999b:
604) was one who was able “to gain the attention of the monarch and persuade him to
introduce some new practice” (Lewis 1999b: 603).9 Victor Mair notes how “Confucius
himself best exemplifies the warrior who turns into a literatus” (Mair 2001: 3), and
some of Confucius’ disciples were likewise shi. Those who were drawn into state
service served primarily as administrative officials who were in charge of maintaining
population registers, records of taxes and services, and so on.10
As we will see below, the service that the shi performed for the ruler often consisted
of surveillance, discipline, and punishment exercised over the commoners. The char-
acters in this chapter on “Worldly Affairs” mirror the status of the shi who would have
been Zhuangzi’s audience or readers. They would have seen that the reservations
expressed in the chapter as directed at the advisory and administrative roles they
performed for the sovereign. It is not necessarily the practice of politics tout court that
is the subject here.
9 Note the differences between persuaders and alliance formers and scholars.
10 However, unlike successful generals and ministers who “attracted disciples and formed textual traditions”
(Lewis 1999b: 642), “[t]he few scholars whose names and careers are preserved do not seem to have had
successful political careers” (Lewis 1999b: 641). In the early days of the philosophical “schools” multiple
competing centers of political authority meant an economic base that underwrote doctrinal independence, even
opposition (Lewis 1999a: 63–79).
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4 The Complicity of Sages and Their Ideals
The criticism of scholarly collusion with violent territorial acquisition and consolidation
is made very clear in several places in the Outer Chapters. One may of course object
that administrative practice is quite different from ideals, and that the chapter on
“Worldly Affairs” is precisely the lamentation of shi unable to put their principles into
action, and that it is regret, chagrin or frustration that the chapter expresses, a condem-
nation of the age, rather than of shi or their ideals and knowledge. However,
Chapter Ten, “Ransacking Coffers (Qu Qie 胠篋),”11 explicitly criticizes sagely ideals
for their complicity, not just in justifying or legitimizing imperial expropriation, but for
producing the very structures through which such expropriation takes place.
In other words, the problem is not just the application of ideals in practice, or the
noncompliance of practice with ideals. The ideals themselves are the problem. This
may be seen from the following passage from “Ransacking Coffers”:
Isn’t he whom the common people call a wise man [zhi zhe知者] in fact someone
who piles up loot for a great thief? And he whom they call a sage (sheng zhe 聖
者]) in fact just a guard in the service of the great thieves? How do I know this is
so? The state of Qi [齊] was in olden days so densely populated that one could
peer over to the neighboring village and hear its dogs and chickens. The territory
reached by Qi’s fishing nets and plows exceeded two thousand square miles. And
in all the shrines and temples, in every province and hamlet and town, there was
no corner that was not regulated by the laws [fa法] of the sages (sheng ren聖人).
Then one day, TIAN Chengzi [田成子] killed the ruler of Qi and took his state. But
what he stole was not only the state; with it, he appropriated the laws devised by
the sagely wisdom (sheng zhi zhi fa 聖知之法). So although TIAN Chengzi may
have been called a thief, he lived as securely as the [legendary] sage-rulers Yao
[堯] and Shun [舜]. Smaller states dared not criticize him and larger states dared
not attack him, and his family held on to the throne of Qi for twelve generations.
Did he not then steal, along with the state of Qi, the rules of sagely wisdom by
which to protect his thieving self? (Zhuangzi 23/10/2–24/10/9; Ziporyn 2009:
181–182; with slight modification)
Is this political cynicism? (It does accord with the view of renowned sociologist and
political scientist, Charles Tilly [1985], who saw the state as a protection racket and a
form of organized crime.) What does the Zhuangzi mean when it says that “what [TIAN
Chengzi] stole was not only the state; with it, he appropriated the laws devised by the
sagely wisdom,” or that, “along with the state of Qi, [he stole] the rules of sagely
wisdom by which to protect his thieving self”? How can laws get stolen? The
formulation suggests that it is not simply a case of “sages” pandering to the new ruler,
but something more fundamentally problematic, something that touches upon the very
constitution of the state.
Indeed political entities underwent drastic changes as the Zhuangzi was composed
and compiled, and these changes had significant consequences on the lives of the
common people. Political authority was increasingly decentralized during the Zhou
11 Here I use Victor Mair’s translation of quqie 胠篋 (Mair 1994).
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dynasty (1046–256 B.C.E.), and devolved to noncontiguous garrison states with a large
rural hinterland serving local hegemons. By the time of the Warring States, rulers had
extended and tightened their control over the countryside, drafted rural populations into
the military, levied new taxes, and were undertaking large-scale infrastructural projects
such as roads and irrigation. Wars became more ferocious and extended. In the Spring
and Autumn period wars lasted a day or two; by the time of the Warring States they
often lasted more than a year, with battles fought primarily by large infantry armies
composed of expendable peasants (Lewis 1999b: 625).
The shi were actively involved in military recruitment for these wars, with the
authority to punish noncompliant commoners. They themselves were appointed ac-
cording to formalized rules. Legal documents found in Yunmeng 雲夢 reveal that the
Qin 秦, which later conquered other warring states to form the first empire, had
concocted complex institutional means to extend administrative capabilities into the
rural hinterland while retaining oversight of officials; annual statistical reports to assess
officials’ effectiveness, “guidelines for official conduct,” as well as “procedures for the
inspection of officials” (Lewis 1999b: 609–610) centralized bureaucratic knowledge
and discipline.12
Commoners were drawn into systems of surveillance by and service to the state. In
the Zhou, commoners had no family names. By the 6th century B.C.E. the assignation
of family names enabled a systematic registration of the population (Lewis 1999a: 25–
26). Reforms instituted during the Warring States in the Qin included the organization
of peasant households into units of five to ten households “for mutual responsibility
and surveillance.” If any one hid a defector, all households received the military
punishment for surrendering to an enemy; those who reported the culprit reaped the
rewards soldiers would receive for enemies’ heads in battle (Lewis 1999b: 611). The
measures “devoted to the control and mobilization of the rural populace” were admin-
istered by a vast army of officials.
In light of such historical verities, the Zhuangzi’s objections to sages and their laws
are in fact a statement of a profound politico-philosophical problem, namely, the
contingency of knowledge vis-à-vis the political problems it is called upon to resolve.
What are the ends to which the knowledge of how to govern is applied? The point is
made polemically: the sageliness that orders and organizes the state in fact makes it
easier for the usurper and tyrant to assert their control. Zhuangzi makes problematic the
efficacy of governance itself.
Whether the efficacy of governance is always desirable is questioned in this passage:
So as long as the great robbers continue to go scot-free—as long as these feudal
lords continue to be exalted—they will keep stealing benevolence [ren 仁] and
appropriate conduct [yi義] together with the weights, measures, scales, balances,
tallies, and seals that ensure their advantage. (Zhuangzi 24/10/17–18; Ziporyn
2009: 184)13
12 Independent officials were given “salaries measured, and partially paid, in grain; rewards of gold and silver
for meritorious service; seals and tallies to bestow and withdraw authority; numerical accounting procedures to
examine officials; regular methods of making appointments” (Lewis 1999b: 606).
13 Here I replace Ziporyn’s translation of yi 義 as “righteousness” with Nylan’s “appropriate conduct” (Nylan
2016: 97).
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Here the Zhuangzi joins the normative knowledge of ideals (benevolence and righ-
teousness) to mundane and technical forms of knowledge. Contemporary scholarship
tends to categorize the former as a normative discourse, and the latter as a utilitarian
one; “weights, measures, scales, balances, tallies, and seals” seem merely “value-
neutral” tools, neither good nor bad in themselves, but rather instruments that can be
put to ends either good or bad.
Historical record shows how the standardization of units of measure—the prolifer-
ation of “weights, measures, scales, balances, tallies, and seals”—made it possible for
officials to make “statistical reports on stocks of grain, registered population, land
opened to cultivation, tax and labor services collected, and pubic security,” with
nonadherence punishable by fines (Lewis 1999b: 609). It was precisely technical
knowledge or technē, and its standardization, that made it possible for shi to serve as
representatives of state authority, in the remote control and quasi-imperial penetration
of rural hinterlands. The peasants’ compliance, and the fruits of their corvée labor, were
the objectives of these measures and the objects of measurement. It is no coincidence
that the development of these measurements at the same time corresponded to “the first
discussion of Warring States law in its classic form” in Fa Jing法經 (Canon of Laws),
and that this law should be “an extended code devoted to penal measures to control the
people” (Lewis 1999b: 605–606).
Whatever political efficacy the scholars exercised would not so much be directed
“upward,” in advising or even reforming rulers, but rather “downward,” in enforcing
the compliance of the commoners. This is ironically alluded to in the Zhuangzi: “He
who steals a belt buckle is executed, but he who steals a state is made a feudal lord”
(Zhuangzi 24/10/19–20; Ziporyn 2009: 184). It is possible that this is the
Zhuangzi’s criticism of the gap between what the shi say and what they
actually do, the gap between their ideals and their actions, or that it is a
criticism of the hypocritical preferential treatment of political superiors. Thus
one possible reading of the passage is as a criticism of scholars who sold their services to
territorial rulers (Needham 1956).
However, the Zhuangzi seems to be making a more radical claim, namely, that ideals
themselves are a real source of the problem. According to the Zhuangzi, sages
themselves are tools or weapons (qi 器). Hence:
Cut off sageliness, cast away wisdom [zhi 知], and then the great thieves will
cease. […] Burn the tallies, shatter the seals, and the people will be simple and
guileless. Hack up the bushels, snap the balances in two, and the people will no
longer wrangle. Destroy and wipe out the laws that the sage has made for the
world, and at last you will find you can reason with the people [min 民].
(Zhuangzi 24/10/22–24; Watson 2013: 71)
In both passages quoted, zhi 知, which can be translated as “knowledge” or “wisdom,”
has direct political consequences. The matter cannot be resolved simply by saying that
the reality or practice of governing has fallen short of ideals. It is the ideals and norms
themselves that are the problem. The Zhuangzi implies that sagely discourse, the
discourse of benevolence and appropriate conduct, is inseparable from a discourse of
stately efficacy. In other words, sagely ideals are complicit with an oppressive dis-
course of discipline and efficacy. This is why the Zhuangzi recommends the complete
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eradication of sagely laws (Zhuangzi 24/10/24), and casting aside “benevolence” and
“appropriate conduct” (rang qi ren yi 攘棄仁義; Zhuangzi 24/10/27).14
In the chapter on “Ransacking Coffers” the Zhuangzi places ideals and principles
(benevolence, appropriate conduct) on the same plane as mundane, technical ways of
knowing, because the two modes of knowledge have the same effect. This effect is what
matters. This is reinforced elsewhere. In the Outer Chapter, “Webbed Toes (Pian Mu駢
拇)” compares attempts to inculcate benevolence and appropriate conduct to the tearing
apart of webbed toes and the cutting off of extra digits; the following chapter, “Horses’
Hooves (Ma Ti 馬蹄 ),” describes how the practice of benevolence and appropriate
conduct leads to the destruction of the dao and its virtue—for which the sage is
squarely to be blamed (Zhuangzi 23/9/14). The damage done by the sages is couched
in terms of a violation of dao.
Sages, their laws, and their knowledge or wisdom, are the problem: “The sage brings
little benefit to the world, but much harm.” Thus within a short space the Zhuangzi calls
for punishment, even death, to sages: “Cudgel and cane the sages and let the thieves
and bandits go their way; then the world will at last be well ordered!” “[I]f the sage is
dead and gone, then no more great thieves will arise. The world will then be peaceful
and free of fuss. But until the sage is dead, great thieves will never cease to appear”
(Zhuangzi 24/10/15–16).
This emphatic condemnation, which spins into violent hyperbole, is a response to
the problems brought about by sages and their conduct. And these, as we will see in the
following section, are problems of cosmic proportions.
5 Cosmos-politics
The Zhuangzi does not just condemn sages and their sagely wisdom for the govern-
mental, administrative, and disciplinary functions they served. The wisdom of the
sages, and a concomitant inordinate grasping after knowledge, is depicted at the end
of the chapter “Ransacking Coffers” as part of a great cosmic derangement that throws
birds, beasts, fishes, the sun, moon, mountains, and rivers into disarray:
As long as men in high places covet wisdom but are without the Way [hao zhi er
wu dao 好知而無道], the world will be in great confusion.
How do we know this is so? An abundance of knowledge about crossbows
and arrows, traps and nets, and other contraptions, drives birds to a tumult [luan
亂] in the sky. An abundance of knowledge about hooks, bait, nets, poles, and
lures drives fish to a tumult in the waters. An abundance of knowledge about
traps, nets, snares, and lattices drive beasts to a tumult in the marshes. And
knowledge turns into cunning, like a kind of gradual poisoning, rigidifying and
unmooring “hard” and “white,” disjoining and muddying “sameness” and
14 The entire sentence reads rang qi ren yi, er tian xia zhi de shi xuan tong yi 攘棄仁義, 而天下之德始玄同矣.
Xuan tong 玄同 is difficult to translate. Watson translates it as “mysterious leveling,” Ziporyn as “oblivious
unity,” and Legge, “mysterious excellence” (Watson 2013: 71; Ziporyn 2009: 186; Legge 1891). It also occurs
in Chapters 15 and 56 of the Daodejing, and sample translations (out of the 300 available, cf. Kohn 2012)
include “dark identity” (Lau 1994), “mysterious union” (Henricks 1989), “profoundest consonance” (Ames
and Hall 2003).
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“difference,” baffling the commoners with disputation and sophistry. Thus it is
that each and every great derangement [da luan 大亂] of the world is caused by
the coveting of knowledge. […] Everyone understands enough to reject what
they consider bad, but not enough to reject what they consider good. This is the
reason for the great disorder, which violates the brightness of the sun and moon
above and melts away the vital essence of the mountains and rivers below,
toppling the ordered succession of the four seasons in between. All creatures,
down to the smallest wriggling and fluttering insects, have thus lost touch with
their inborn natures. How profoundly the coveting of knowledge [hao zhi 好知]
throws the world into tumult! (Zhuangzi 25/10/34–40; Ziporyn 2009: 188)
It is true that the Zhuangzi often uses allegory, metaphor, hyperbole, and absurdity.
However, there is a sense in which the correlation between a cosmos out of joint and
the oppression perpetuated by sagely ideals and actions may be more than pure
exaggeration for rhetorical effect. To more accurately interpret this charge of cosmic
derangement that the Zhuangzi brings against the sages, we have to place it within the
context of what anthropologists call “Chinese correlative cosmology” or what
Michael Nylan describes as “resonance cosmology,” which is a profoundly
different way of conceiving human, nonhuman, and cosmic agency (Nylan
2016: 100; cf. Descola 2013).
Resonance cosmology consists of myriad techno-epistemological practices for mak-
ing sense of the interrelations between natural and social changes, natural and social
rhythms of existence. They are “cosmological” because these techniques situate politics
strictly within the orbit of other natural, nonhuman flows. They observe resonances
across musical notes, numbers, colors, gods, spirits, creatures, heavenly bodies, the
seasons, and the elements of wood, fire, wind, water, and earth (in the Warring States
period).15 For instance, a calendar of divination unearthed in Changsha 長沙 in China
that dates back to the Warring States lists propitious times for “activities includ[ing]
military actions, meeting with other lords for allies, constructing cities and buildings,
taking in and marrying off women, ritual ceremonies, and the execution of wicked
people.” If these activities were carried out at the wrong time,
[T]hey would induce catastrophes and disorder in the universe, including land-
slides, floods, disorders in the moving patterns of heavenly bodies, abnormal
growth of vegetation, unseasonable rain and storms, robbery, and calam-
ities and chaos in the state. These catastrophes and disorders became
omens—signs signifying a disruption of the divine cosmic order by human
activities. (Wang 2000: 109)
Thus, rulers’ actions can lead to natural disasters; conversely, natural disasters can be a
sign of deranged governance. Old resonance practices (such as the yin-yang 陰陽,
sifang 四方, and wuxing 五行 ) were often overlaid with new elements in the course
15 See the illuminating table in Wang 2000: 115. For instance, a set of calendrical regulations found in the
Shangshu 尚書 (also known as Shujing 書經 or Book of Documents) match the rhythms of the life of the
common people (min 民) to the seasons: “After the spring equinox is set, the people (min) ‘disperse’ (xi 析 );
after the summer solstice, they ‘act in accordance’ (yin因 ); after the autumn equinox, they are ‘at ease’ (yi夷 )
and after the winter solstice, they ‘keep in the warm’ (yu 隩 )” (Kern 2005: 130; cf. Allan 1991).
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of imperial, dynastic, and political change. This was partly because these resonance
cosmologies legitimized dynasty dominance, even as they constituted a form of techné
that guided the government of a territory.16
Colonial encounters dismissed these as “superstition” or “primitive thinking”
(Clarke 2000: 69; cf. Matthews 2017). However, if one were to insist on a translation
into contemporary terms, resonance cosmologies may be seen as ways of mapping the
interdependencies of human and more-than-human realms (cf. Puett 2004). Rituals that
bound human and cosmic activities were not just religious prescriptions but were de
facto laws, as is hinted at in the Zuo Zhuan左傳 (Commentary of Zuo), which calls war
and ritual “the two principal affairs of state” (Chang 1983: 108). The cosmologies were
an attempt to use the knowledge of the past to predict the outcomes of possible actions
(Chang 1983: 88). Their increasing codification, especially from the Zhou onwards,
signaled the consolidation of such techniques of government by the rising shi class. Shi
leveraged their knowledge of the exemplary actions of past sage kings to advise rulers
(Chang 1983: 80).
The cosmological context implies that a North Atlantic idea of the “ideal” cannot be
applied to without qualification to the description of sagely “ideals” in the Zhuangzi. In
the Zhuangzi, there is no purely eidetic or Platonic “justice” or “benevolence,” nor
“oughts” that ought to happen even if they may never come to pass (à la Kant’s
categorical imperative). Everything is cosmically and politically entwined. This is why,
in the Zhuangzi, knowledge or wisdom itself (zhi 知) can generate cosmopolitical
derangement (luan 亂).17 Ritual practices (the “tallies” and “seals”) embody sagely
knowledge, and, in doing so, call forth the disasters they are supposed to avert; sagely
ideals (benevolence, righteousness) provoke cosmic catastrophes. This is why the
Zhuangzi passes so quickly between things that may appear to us as unrelated, from
the tumult of the birds, the animals, and fishes, to the confusion and muddle of
the people. Government involves not just the ordering of the human population,
but also the ordering of the nonhuman milieu and the biotic realms on which
human existence depends.
6 Against Exemplary Sage-Emperors
The Zhuangzi’s contrarian view of sagely knowledge is reinforced in its treatment of
the mythical sage-emperors, Huangdi黃帝, Yao堯, and Shun舜. Outside of the Daoist
tradition, they are regarded as exemplary founders of human civilization, of its laws,
moral codes, and agricultural orders that separate man from beast (Lewis 2009: 554).
Toward these sage-kings, however, the Zhuangzi is at best ambivalent (especially in the
case of Huangdi or the Yellow Emperor, who is depicted at times as a seeker of dao and
at other times as Ur-meddler), and mainly critical (Karlgren 1946; Girardot 1988).18
16 Wang calls this “the mutual production of cosmology and empire” (Wang 2000: 4).
17 I have chosen to use the word “derangement” rather than “disorder” or “chaos” for two reasons. First,
“chaos” or “disorder” is associated with Hun Dun混沌, which is prior and/or superior; second, the associations
of “chaos” from its Greek etymology renders it problematic and somewhat imprecise for describing the
disarray conjured in the Zhuangzi.
18 On the euhemerism and the mythic and historical dimensions of these sage-emperors, see Lewis 2009,
Sellman 1992/1993, and Allan 1981.
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The chapter “Letting Be (Zai You在宥)” follows convention by identifying Huangdi
with the beginning of civilization. Yet, civilization is not equated with progress. The
Zhuangzi portrays the advent of civilization as the beginning of a general enervation, a
long-drawn degeneration:
In ancient times Huangdi first used benevolence and appropriate conduct [ren yi
仁義] to meddle with the minds of men. Yao and Shun followed him and worked
till there was no more down on their thighs, no more hair on their shins, trying to
nourish the bodies of the men of the world. They grieved their five vital organs in
the practice of benevolence and appropriate conduct, taxed their blood and
breath in the establishment of laws and standards. But still some men
would not submit to their rule, and so they had to exile Huan Dou [讙兜]
to Mount Chong崇, drive away the Sanmiao [三苗] tribes to Sanwei [三峗].... This
shows that they could not make the world submit. (Zhuangzi 26/11/19–22;
Watson 2013: 76)
Here, benevolence and appropriate conduct are not at all “pacifist.” They involve
forcible submission, violence to practitioners as well as rebels, and exile of those
who chose not to obey.
Likewise, the chapter on “Mending Inborn Nature (Shan Xing 繕性)” firmly places
the appearance of legendary sages, heroes, and legislators,19 as well as their actions, as
a turn away from a cosmic consonance (or “oneness,” yi 一):
In bygone times humans dwelt in crudity and chaos (hun mang 混芒), one with
the placid tranquility of the world. At that time the yin and yang were harmonious
and still, ghosts and spirits worked no mischief, the four seasons kept to
their proper order, all things knew no injury, and no life came to a
premature end. Although men had knowledge, they did not use it. This
was called oneness [yi 一]. At this time, no one acted, and there was unvarying
spontaneity [mo zhi wei er chang zi ran 莫之為而常自然].20
The time came, however, when virtue [de 德] began to dwindle and decline,
and then Sui Ren [燧人] and Fu Xi [伏羲] stepped forward to take charge of the
world. As a result there was compliance, but no longer any unity. […] [T]hen
Shen Nong [神農] and the Huangdi stepped forward to take charge of the world.
As a result, there was security, but no longer any compliance. […] [T]hen Yao
and Shun stepped forward to take charge of the world. They set about in various
fashions to order and transform the world, and in doing so defiled purity and
shattered simplicity. The Dao was pulled apart for the sake of goodness; virtue
was imperiled for the sake of conduct. […] the people began to be confused and
disordered. They had no way to revert to the true form of their inborn nature [xing
性] or to return once more to the beginning [fu復]. (Zhuangzi 41/16/5–11; Watson
2013: 123, with modifications)
19 Figures traditionally called “Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors (San Huang Wu Di 三皇五帝)” (Chang
1983: 2).
20 Here, I have tinkered with Watson’s translation; alas it is near impossible to translate yi 一 , and I have
chosen to go with Nylan’s “oneness,” although that raises the specter of monotheism.
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The section above describes a time that seems to precede the cosmic derangement we
examined earlier. Notably, the actions of the sage emperors correspond to a decline, but
it is unclear if they actually caused this decline; there is a sense in which the actions of
the sage emperors may have been compensatory, though it is ambiguous.
While we cannot be entirely sure, such an interpretation would be in line with the
Zhuangzi’s unusual portraits of the emperors. We see Huangdi, for instance, seeking
wisdom from a mountain hermit; the hermit’s words shock Huangdi into relinquishing
his throne, and secluding himself in a lonely hut, before returning after three months to
ask the hermit a different question (cf. Michael 2015). Instead of a sagely figure who
creates order, in that particular narrative Huangdi’s desires to master heaven and earth,
yin and yang, produce a cosmic disorder that even turns the light of the sun and moon
sickly. Instead of a figure of wisdom worthy of emulation, he knows neither what is
best for him, nor what is best for the world he would govern.
Thus, to pin the cosmic decline upon the emperors (and their actions) is still to
attribute to them a certain potency, even if the potency has negative effects. To refuse to
identify them as the source or cause of such decline casts doubt upon the potency
traditionally attributed to them. Rather than figures standing above the fray ordering
terrestrial flows and human lives, these sage emperors are equally caught up in the
cosmic jumble and are scrambling to respond best as they can, even as their responses
fall short.
The Zhuangzi’s antifoundationalism, in its rejection of the sage emperor as exemplar
and role model, rejects by implication their legitimizing function in discourses on
rulership.
7 Playful Speculations on Cook Ding
This final section ends with a speculative interpretation of the Zhuangzi’s famous story
of Cook Ding (Pao Ding 庖丁), who was butchering an ox for Duke Wenhui 文惠 of
Wei魏 (r. 369–319 B.C.E.) (Zhuangzi 7/3/2–8/3/12). As Duke Wenhui, watching Ding,
marvels at the cook’s skill, the latter lays down his knife, and proceeds, rather
surprisingly, to explain his methods of ox carving to Duke Wenhui. He describes
how he no longer sees the ox, but follows the daemon (shen 神); sliding his knife
through the hollows, he touches no bone, ligament, or tendon; this is why this knife has
remained sharp for nineteen years, without needing a whetstone. Ding tells Duke
Wenhui how he works with difficult spots, carefully, slowly, and how, with the slightest
movement of his knife, the whole thing comes apart like a clod of earth (tu 土)
crumbling to the ground. Instead of rebuking him for insolence, the duke exclaims that
the cook has taught him how to nourish life (yang sheng 養生).
The Cook Ding story is often interpreted by Anglophone scholars as a lesson in
skillful spontaneity (e.g., Eno 1996, Yearley 1996, Fox 1996, Slingerland 2003,
Graham 1989, Hansen 1992, Ivanhoe 1993, Fraser 2014).21 This article does not weigh
in on these readings, but proposes another interpretive consideration. The Zhuangzi
describes how the cook moves rhythmically, “as though he were performing the dance
of the Mulberry Grove or keeping time to the ‘Jingshou Chorus’ of the ancient sage-
21 For an argument against this dominant interpretation, see Schwitzgebel 2017.
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kings” (Zhuangzi 7/3/4). These were politico-religious rituals, alluding to a rain dance
from the Shang 商 dynasty, and music dating back to the rule of Yao respectively
(Watson 2013: 50). As one of numerous analogies between governing and cooking
found in Warring States and Han 漢 dynasty literature (Sterckx 2011: 49–82), in
which the sacrifice of animals and the eating of their flesh in ritual banquets
was a way to access the potency of the spirit world, there is a clear allusion
here to politics, though the precise point of that allusion remains somewhat
elusive.22 Given the political and ritual role of sacrifice, the “dietetic and
nutritional values associated with food” were fused with and inseparable from
their cosmological, religious, and political values (Graziani 2005: 65). Thus, it
would not have been implausible for the duke to find an aspect of the culinary
arts relevant to his own conduct as political figure.
The duke’s observation, that he has learned how to nourish life from a
bloody act of butchery, seems rather a non sequitur, at once paradoxical and
ironic. There is a hermeneutic gap between the cook’s explanations of ox-
carving and the duke’s profession to have learned how to nourish life from
these explanations.
It is true there are ample signals that the cook is not “just” talking about ox-
carving (though in the topsy-turvy world of the Zhuangzi perhaps that is not as
unimportant a task as one may think). Ding explains that he is one who thirsts
for the dao (hao zhe dao 好者道). The thirst for dao is a contrast to the striving
for knowledge (hao zhi 好知) of the sages. He does not see the ox, but lets
himself be guided by what Graziani calls a clairvoyance (shen 神) (Zhuangzi
7/3/6); Ding’s description of the knife’s edge having no thickness at all—and if
“the joints have spaces within them, and the very edge of the blade has no thickness at
all” (Ziporyn 2009: 86) then the blade may “wander” (you 遊) in a vast space—recalls
Zeno’s paradoxes.
These hints, however, still do not constitute a series of propositions which
one can follow to the conclusion, “Ah, so this is how one nourishes life!” What
Ding imparts is not a technical form of knowledge that consists of means and
ends, for surely it cannot mean that the duke, too, should take up butchery. In
other words, even if we are to trust in the insights of the duke’s learning, namely, that the
cook’s statements are indeed about the nurturing of life, it is still unclear how and why
exactly that is the case.
There is further the question of whose life it is that the duke has learned to nourish or
care for. In this regard, I would like to raise here a couple of related considerations.
First, we must be careful about projecting a very specific form of a modern subjectivity
or individual onto the Zhuangzi, and this is what C. B. MacPherson has described as
22 There are many analogies between governing and cooking that allude to accounts of butchers who became
ministers, or cooks who became officials, including in the Huainanzi, Guanzi管子, and Shiji 史記 (Records of
the Grand Historian). Examples are LÜ Wang呂望 or Taigong Wang 太公望, whom King Wen of Zhou (Zhou
Wen Wang 周文王) made a minister, and YI Yin 伊尹, appointed by King Tang 湯 of the Shang dynasty. On
whether these are “fictive” or “real” historical personages, see the discussions of euhemerization in Lagerwey
and Kalinowski 2009. Officials and stewards overseeing the kitchen and in charge of sacrificial supplies from
the Western Zhou to the Warring States and the Han eras wielded considerable political power. They did not
have noble status, but were ranked above working craftsmen, and served as gong工 or “craft officers” (Powers
2006, cited in Sterckx 2011: 55).
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“possessive individualism,” in which individuals are imagined as atomistic entities
(MacPherson 1962; cf. Chai 2019).23 That is to say, our default answer to the question,
“Whose, or which, life is nourished?” may be: “The duke’s.” However, this is not
necessarily the Zhuangzi’s answer. In the beginning of the chapter that tells Cook
Ding’s story, the following advice is dispensed:
If you do good, stay away from fame. If you do evil, stay away from punish-
ments. Tend toward the “central meridian,”24 and preserve the body, keep life
intact, care for kin [qin親], and live out the limits of [one’s] years. (Zhuangzi 7/3/
2; Watson 2013: 19, with modifications)
The course of action advised here involves general prescriptions that may apply to
diverse roles; the counsel to care for kin shows an acceptance of social and ritual roles.
Thus “nourishing life” (yang sheng 養生) may not be restricted to the individual’s
physiological or personal well-being.25
We will begin with the contrast to other conventional analogies made between the
culinary and political arts. When Ding encounters a difficult spot, he works carefully,
slowly, and with the slightest movement of his knife, the whole thing comes apart like
soil or earth (tu土) crumbling to the ground. Other culinary analogies use the harmony
of “five flavors” (wu wei 五味) to symbolize a partaking of “the cosmos itself,” to
“ensure the harmonious passage of time and season” (Sterckx 2011: 18), or the judicious
measuring of portions of meat to allude to impartial politico-juridical judgment. These
are absent in the Cook Ding passage. Instead, Ding’s dao of ox carving results in flesh
that falls apart onto the ground like so much earth. If the harmony of flavors served as an
analogy for cosmic and social harmony, and if proportionality served as an analogy for
measured judgment, then what might this analogy of lumpen earth stand for?
One possible interpretation is suggested by the image of earth or soil in the story of
Liezi列子 in the last of the Inner Chapters, “For Emperors and Kings (Ying Di Wang應
帝王)”.26 It is too long to recount in full here; what is significant for us is that Liezi, in
the process of learning from his master, Huzi 壺子,27 finally realizes
23 The individual is seen as “essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to
society for them” (MacPherson 1962: 3). I am not claiming that this is Graziani’s understanding, only that it is
a mistake we—that is, those trained in the conventions of a North Atlantic academy—risk making. The
question is not so much what those men who lived at the time were “really like,” as historian and public
intellectual Mary Beard has noted about another body of classics, but rather, what concerns and worldviews
may be revealed by texts like the Zhuangzi, and other kinds of archaeological and historical research.
24 Ziporyn explains this medical term in his notes (Ziporyn 2009: 89).
25 However, even if Ding’s statements do teach the duke about personal well-being, this well-being is not
limited to the duke’s person alone. Livia Kohn explains that in the tradition of longevity techniques (Kohn
2012: 14), health and well-being do not come from care of the self and body alone; there has to be the
maintenance, through the senses, emotions, and virtues, of a harmonious flow from the surroundings, of air,
food, and social interaction, “families, clans, villages, and states” (Kohn 2012: 5), while Heshanggong
Zhangju 河上公章句 (The Heshang Gong Commentary on Laozi’s Daodejing) explicitly linked “personal
cultivation and the perfection of rulership” (Kohn 2012: 15).
26 Watson translates this somewhat literally as “Fit for Emperors and Kings,” while Ziporyn translates it as
“Sovereign Responses for Ruling Powers” (see Ziporyn 2009, Watson 2013).
27 Hu 壺 can also refer to the vessel, “pot,” which has an empty center, and is an important image in the
Daodejing.
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[H]e had never really begun to learn anything. He went home and for three years
did not go out. He replaced his wife at the stove, fed the pigs as though
he were feeding people, and showed no preferences in the things he did.
He […] returned to plainness, letting his body stand solitary like a clod
[kuai 塊].28 (Zhuangzi 21/7/30–31)
The word kuai 塊 in this context refers to a “lump” or “chunk” of earth. Like tu in the
Cook Ding story, kuai29 here also invokes a lumpish undifferentiatedness. In the Liezi
passage, the roles of male and female, husband and wife (and, by extrapolation, cosmic
yin and yang) are turned topsy-turvy, and the differentiations between beasts and
humans are effaced.
To return to the narrative of Cook Ding, his ox-carving is not described in the text in
terms of measure or proportionality (which symbolize impartiality and fair judgment),
nor in terms of a harmony of taste (the symbol for cosmic and human harmony), but in
terms of a “wandering” that follows cosmic patterns, resulting in the falling apart of
flesh, like so much undifferentiable earth. Despite its association with blood, with
death, Ding’s butchery teaches the duke how to nourish life. Read in light of the
sections cited from the seventh chapter, “For Emperors and Kings,” Ding’s lesson is
perhaps one that advises the duke to not harm a fundamental, cosmic
undifferentiatedness in his actions.
The common people, in the Zhuangzi, are by nature (min xing民性) “simple, crude”
(su pu素樸). The chapter “Horses’ Hooves” describes a “time of Perfect Virtue (zhi de
至德),” when the common people lived as one, not split into factions, and shared in the
same virtue (tong de 同德) (Zhuangzi 23/9/7); what is more, they “lived together with
the birds and beasts, bunched together with all things” (Zhuangzi 23/9/9–11; Watson
2013: 66, with modifications).30 The Zhuangzi compares humans in this condition—
where humans are differentiated neither amongst themselves nor from “birds and
beasts”—to unworked wood, raw clay, and wild horses. The attempts on the part of
the sages to govern (zhi tian xia治天下) by benevolence and appropriate conduct (ren yi
仁義) and ritual prescription resemble the efforts of horse tamers to tame wild horses—
half the horses end up dying. It is not in the nature (xing性) of clay or wood to need the
compass and square, curve and plumb line (that potters and carpenters use to shape
them). In several chapters (4, 8, 9, 10), the Zhuangzi uses similar technical analogies to
criticize the “instruments” of benevolence, appropriate conduct, and ritual prescription
that seek to shape human beings and alter their conduct. Thus, “the mutilation of what
28 Liezi’s realization that “he had never really begun to learn anything” is, as those familiar with the text will
know, far from a negative development. With this realization, Burton Watson thinks Liezi has “reached the
highest stage of understanding” (Watson 2013: 97, n.14). We can at least say, to use the words of the Zhuangzi
in another chapter, “He who knows he is a fool is not the biggest fool; he who knows he is confused is not in
the worst confusion” (“Heaven and Earth (Tiandi天地)”; Watson 1968: 139). I have left out the final sentence,
“In the midst of entanglement he remained sealed, and in this oneness he ended his life” (fen er feng zai, yi yi
shi zhong 紛而封哉, 一以是終). This brings us to the questions of death and oneness or union (yi 一), which are
themselves the subjects of numerous lengthy scholarly treatments.
29 The chapter “Discussion on Making All Things Equal (Qi Wu Lun 齊物論)” also refers to kuai: “The Great
Clod (da kuai 大塊) belches out vital energy (qi 氣), and its name is wind” (Zhuangzi 3/2/4; Watson 2013: 7).
30 The chapter continues with a criticism of sages. As Watson points out in his translation notes, “unpolished
simplicity (su pu素樸)” is also found in chapter 1 of the Daodejing; Hall and Ames have vividly translated the
idiom as “unworked wood” (Watson 2013: 66; Ames and Hall 2003: 120, 166).
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is crude to fashion implements is the crime of the artisan; the destruction of the dao and
its virtuosity (dao de道德) to instill benevolence and appropriate conduct is the fault of
the sage (sheng ren 聖人)” (Zhuangzi 23/9/13–14). However, this brings us to the
question of how the Zhuangzi proposes to “return” the common people to their “crude
and simple” nature.
Whether or not a paradisiacal or prelapsarian idyll exists in the Zhuangzi (Girardot
has claimed it does; see Girardot 198831), it is, in any case, not possible to “return” to
such a state, given the successive interferences of Huangdi, Yao, Shun, and the rest of
the sage kings and emperors. Again, though the Zhuangzi prizes a certain crude
simplicity that manifests itself in diverse ways in different characters,32 there is no
one-size-fits-all prescription, unless one counts “following the dao,” which is abstract
enough to be open—one is tempted to say infinitely—to interpretation. If the common
people are by nature crude and simple, then, given that it may well be impossible to
“return” them to that state (for it is by no means incontrovertible that the “time of
Perfect Virtue [zhi de 至德]” to which the Zhuangzi refers has a sort of chronological
precedence), then what is the best way of going about heeding that nature of the people,
without adhering to a formula for an impossible ideal?
A nonformulaic possibility is outlined in the ox-carving anecdote. Cook Ding’s
knife travels the path of least resistance. He contrasts his carving to that of other cooks:
A good cook changes his knife once a year because he cuts. A mediocre cook
changes his knife once a month because he hacks. I’ve had this knife of
mine for nineteen years and I’ve cut up thousands of oxen with it, and yet
the blade is as good as though it had just come from the whetstone.
(Zhuangzi 7/3/6–8; Watson 2013: 19–20)
Ding does not see an ox, he does not look with his eyes; his is a clairvoyance
(shen 神)33 guided by cosmic patterns (yi hu tian li 依乎天理). The mediocre
cook, because he is unable to sense or abide by cosmic patterns, meets with resistance to
his blade, which blunts it. Likewise, one might say that the ruler whose policies provoke
the resistance of his populace, and who then subdues that resistance with oppression, is
unable to govern according to the “cosmic patterns (tian li天理)” or nature of the people.
Popular resistance is a sign of poor government.
Cook Ding’s method of carving allows plenty of room for the “play of the blade.”
This “play” is significant, for the original Chinese graph that Watson and Ziporyn
translate as “play” is you 遊—the same graph that gives us the title of the Zhuangzi’s
first chapter, “Blithely Wandering (Xiao Yao You逍遙遊).” You遊 signifies wandering,
without an aim, and as a literary trope, it connotes an “untrammeled and carefree
liberation” (Lo 2002: 75). Those who are familiar with the text will already know the
indelible image with which that opening chapter begins: a single, miniscule fish roe
31 Cf. Graham’s analysis of primitivism, and Puett’s and Roth’s criticism of Girardot (Graham 2001, Puett
2000, Roth 1985).
32 See, for instance, the passage on undifferentiated Hun Dun (Zhuangzi 21/7/33–35), whom Graham
describes as “the primal blob,” “a blend of everything rolled together” (Graham 2001: 98–99).
33 Shen 神 is sometimes translated as “spirit,” “soul,” or “invisible spirit vitality” (Cheng 2009: 78). The
closest single English word might be daemon, a vital animating principle, but this then occludes the
cosmological schema on which shen rests, and its dependence for instance on qi 氣.
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transforms into a magnificent, gargantuan bird that creates a storm with a simple
beating of its wings. It is that sort of vast space across oceans, between heaven and
earth, that Cook Ding finds in the joints of an ox. To extrapolate, the play across spaces
contrasts with the tight networks of laws, regulations, statistics, punishments, surveil-
lance, discipline, and enforcement that underwrote imperial territorialization (McNeal
2017). These dynastic and imperial networks of ritual, economic, political activity were
meant to overcome not just geographical and hierarchical distances, but also the
resistance of the people. Instead of finding free space, they tightened control across
spaces. They were designed in fact to overcome space in order to make possible
centralized rule. Thus, just as the unnecessary violence of a mediocre cook’s carving
blunts the knife, making constant work of changing and sharpening tools, likewise the
busyness of imperial governance is related to the control and repression exercised over
the people to ensure the latter’s obedience.34
Thus, though the anecdote of Cook Ding acknowledges the use of technique, it is not
technical, in that it cannot simply be instrumentalized or implemented; it transforms the
person who uses it, and without this transformation, the “technique” would not work.
Hence, the passage turns the question of efficacy away from a perspective of control
over external things, to focus on the need for the political figure to attune itself to that on
which it seeks to act. The text here allows itself no further prescription than this.
8 Conclusion
We have examined the interpretive possibilities of what we categorize today as
“political” elements in the Zhuangzi. Its undermining of the heroism associated with
exemplary sage-sovereigns (such as Huangdi, Yao, or Shun), its charge that the
normative discourses of benevolence and appropriate conduct (ren yi 仁義) are in fact
techniques of an oppressive governmentality, may be seen as critical allusions to
nascent imperial techniques, and increasing state consolidation.
A note of caution: we must resist erroneously turning the Zhuangzi’s critique of
proto-imperial logics into affirmations of laissez-faire liberalism, or libertarianism. Not
only would such a translation be anachronistic, it would also contradict the Zhuangzi’s
lessons on the complicity of elite ideals with oppressions of different kinds. Laissez-
faire liberalism and libertarianism are culturally and historically specific ideas that rest
upon presuppositions concerning the nature of the individual and society, and, as
postcolonial and decolonial writers point out, the ideas themselves are not free of
histories of domination, violence, and colonial suppression that have underwritten their
dissemination (Chakrabarty 2000, Lowe 2015). Further, although the practice of wuwei
無為 (in the Zhuangzi as well as the Daodejing) has been translated as “doing nothing”
(Graham 1989), “nonaction” (Chan 2017), or “non-purposive action” (Schwartz 1985),
when used in a political context it should not be misread as advocacy for a simple
hands-off or night-watchman state approach. The practice of wuwei, when specifically
linked to political claims, for instance in the Outer Chapter “Letting Be (Zai You在宥),”
involves virtuosity, ethical practice, and a profound understanding of the “nature” (xing
34 There are echoes of this critique in the Daodejing’s reference to xuan de 玄德 (“dark virtue” [Lau 1994] or
“profoundest efficacy” [Ames and Hall 2003]; see chapter 10 of the Daodejing).
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性) of things (cf. Lai 2007, Chan 2006, Chai 2014), and in particular, an understanding
ofmin xing民性 or the “commoners’ nature.” The precise conjunction of these different
tropes, however, requires further study and cannot be adequately dealt with here. Thus,
this article does not take a stand on the question of whether the Zhuangzi provides
normative or moral grounds for political action or not.
The Zhuangzi’s reticence, if not downright recalcitrance, may well stem from the
fact that “the Zhuangzi’s masters [zi子] seem to have an intuition that gets lost as soon
as one tries to turn it into a moral system or formal training” (Defoort 2012: 476).
Further, the Zhuangzi’s refractory stance can be understood in light of its audience—
those who would have been capable of deciphering the text would have been precisely
the ones charged with implementing the oppressions we have seen. The Zhuangzi does
not shy away from “political” efficacy as such. In fact, some of its passages boast of a
consummate, unparalleled efficaciousness. However, the text short-circuits every at-
tempt to turn its insights into techniques or methods that can be replicated, applied, or
instrumentalized. Contemporary scholars will be all too familiar with this deliberate
short-circuiting—witness all our tortured attempts to unravel the paradoxes of wuwei.
Thus, though the body of work was ultimately absorbed into the discourses of Han
imperial scholarship, within certain strands of the Zhuangzi, one may discern a drive to
disrupt a nascent imperial discourse, and a performative circumvention of the “virtues”
of an emerging imperialism.
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